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Abstract 
 
This paper gives an overview of some issues related to market valuation, focusing on the 
developments on the New York equity markets. 
 
The 42.4 p.c. fall in the S&P 500 price index between 24 March 2000 - when it reached its 
all-time high - and 31 December 2002 is situated in a very long term perspective.  It then 
appears that some bear markets were more pronounced in the past but that the bull 
market preceding the 2000-2002 bear market had been particularly long and impressive in 
extent. 
 
Given this sharp correction, we will discuss whether the S&P 500 was correctly valued at 
the end of 2002. To this end, we make use of valuation indicators defined as the ratio of 
the price to a fundamental.  The fundamentals considered  here are, according to the 
discount dividend model, annual earnings and, according to Q-theory, net worth. 
 
In December 2002, price-earnings (P/E) still showed a significant overvaluation of equity 
prices when compared to the historical average over the 1871-2002 period but, since July 
2002, the overvaluation has not been significant in the case of Q.  The evidence is even 
more mixed when the comparison is made, for each valuation indicator, with their average 
over the last 10 years. 
 
Simulations based on VAR models for P/E and Q were carried out to check whether, on 
two occasions, the S&P 500 in real terms climbed to a level perceived as irrational given 
past experience, implying that a correction had to be expected.  These occasions were the 
so-called 1929 and 2000 bubbles. 
 
The models showed that, at some point in time before the peak in (real) stock prices was 
reached, the real S&P 500 exceeded the upper band of the 95 p.c. confidence intervals 
during both periods. For each of them, the Q model showed earlier and more persistent 
signals of significant overvaluation of stock prices than for the P/E model.  Finally, in 
December 2002, both models indicated that the stock price had come back largely within 
the confidence interval. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
We take an interest in developments in the American stock markets for three reasons.  
First, in the United States, stock market movements influence both household  and 
business consumption and investment to a greater extent than in other countries. Second, 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the world’s leading stock market. The importance 
of the New York market is even greater if we also take account of the National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) and the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX).  Third, movements in stock market prices in the euro area are correlated with 
those observed in the United States. 
 
The S &P 500 reached an all-time high on 24 March 2000 of 1,527.45 points before 
plummeting by 42.4 p.c. to 879.82 points on the evening of 31 December 2002
1. 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to place this event in a historical perspective and to 
provide some answers to the question whether, despite the sharp correction which has 
already occurred, shares are still overvalued and prices could therefore fall even further. 
This paper aims to be accessible to a broad public. It is divided into three sections. 
 
Section 1 comments on the recent development of the S&P 500 stock price index.  The 
main features are a strong and more or less continuous rise between 1995 and 2000, and 
a sharp fall since the beginning of 2000, which allows the 1995-2000 period as a whole to 
be considered as a financial bubble; hereafter called the "2000 bubble".   
 
The upward phase ("bull market") had already started in August 1982. In this paper, this 
movement and the subsequent downward phase ("bear market") are compared with 
similar phases in the past, especially in real terms.  Finally, the parallel has been drawn 
between the 2000 bubble and the one which occurred in 1929. 
 
Although some conclusions could be drawn from these historical comparisons, one has to 
take a more in depth look to fully understand the current valuation of the stock market. 
 
Section 2 raises the question of the "random walk" hypothesis.  According to the theory of 
efficient markets, stock market prices are supposed to follow a random walk, and thus it is 
                                                                 
1   Unless otherwise specified, all time series data presented in this article have 31 December 2002 as the cut-off date on 
the basis of information available on 31 January 2003.  
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impossible to predict their  future movements.  This hypothesis has been tested and  is 
strongly rejected. 
 
The rejection of the random walk hypothesis implies that stock prices can be forecasted to 
a certain extent.  To this end, it is necessary to use instruments which link the price of 
shares to a "fundamental". Section 3 is devoted to analysing these valuation indicators. 
Two fundamentals are  mainly  examined: earnings and net worth. The first  finds its 
justification from the discount dividend model, while the second comes from the Tobin's 
Q theory of investment.  After a brief review of the key aspects of these theories, section 3 
contains a presentation of the data and a descriptive analysis.  This starts with an initial 
outline of the current valuation of stock prices by comparing the latest observed data for 
each of the valuation indicators with their historical average.  We have also  checked 
whether, in the past, the two valuation indicators under review gave the correct signals 
regarding future movement in stock  prices, especially before the major turning points. 
Finally, we examine whether the  extreme variations of the valuation indicators were 
caused by changes in real stock prices or by changes in real fundamentals.   
 
Section 3 ends with a simulation exercise based on  VAR models. We have particularly 
analysed, for the 1929 and the 2000 bubbles, whether the sharp fluctuations in the stock 
price were compatible with the evolution of company earnings and net worth.  
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1.  RECENT AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE S&P 500 
 
There are several stock markets operating in the United States.  The best-known among 
them are situated in New York; these are, in decreasing order of size according to the 
stock market capitalisation of the shares quoted on them, the NYSE, the NASDAQ and the 
AMEX.  The comments made in this article relate to the above-mentioned markets and are 
confined to share transactions. 
 
Over time, some private companies have developed  indices enabling the general 
development of American stock markets to be assessed.  These  indices may differ from 
one to another according to criteria such as the method of weighting the index, the markets 
covered, the type of companies, the number of companies, the breakdown between 
markets and the relative weight given to the economic sectors.  In this paper, we focus
2 on 
the S&P 500 index. 
 
Since 1995, the S&P 500
3 has experienced two phases: an almost constant rise between 
January 1995 and 24 March 2000, and a plunge down to a low point reached on 9 October 
2002. A rebound followed until 28 November but the index declined again somewhat in 
December. 
                                                                 
2   There are other stock price indices which cover the American markets.  In decreasing order of market capitalisation (as 
at the end of June 2002), these indices are the Wilshire 5000, the Thomson Financial Datastream total market, the 
S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and the Nasdaq Composite.  We give preference to the S&P 500 
index mainly because it is the reference index for portfolio management and is the only one of these indices for which 
there are monthly historical series, both for prices and for other series which are useful for our research (dividends, 
earnings, …), going back as far as 1871. The availability of such long series is a considerable asset for empirical, 
statistical and above all econometric work. Other reasons, not specific to the S&P 500, justify that we have recourse to it: 
the price evolution of this index, together with that of the Thomson Financial Datastream's total market index, is the most 
closely correlated to that of the broadest stock price index, the Wilshire 5000. The S&P 500 is also broadly 
representative of the American stock markets: at the end of June 2002, its market value represented 78 p.c. of that of the 
Wilshire 5000. Finally, unlike the DJIA, it is weighted by stock market capitalisation. 
3   Throughout the paper, we shall focus on the price variations of the  indices as our  main  concern is stock market 
valuation. Nevertheless, an investor also pays attention to dividends as they are part of the return.  
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Chart 1 - S&P 500 stock price index since 1995 
(Index 2 January 1995 = 100) 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream. 
 
Between January 1995 and March 2000, the S&P 500 had just over tripled in value.  This 
important progression of the index  led many analysts to qualify it, in retrospect,  as a 
bubble. Consequently, the index showed a sharp correction.  It went down 49.1 p.c. to the 
low reached on 9 October 2002.  At the end of the period, the price index still showed a 
substantial increase since January 1995. 
 
This recent evolution of the S&P 500 can be placed in a long-term perspective as, whereas 
the S&P 500 was not actually introduced until 1928, in the 1930s the Cowles Commission
4 
made it possible to reconstitute a historical monthly series going back to the year 1871
5. 
                                                                 
4   Cowles and Associates (1939). 
5   The data  is  made  available by Professor Robert J. Shiller on  the  University of Yale  website: 
http:\\aida.econ.yale.edu\~shiller\data.htm.  Whereas data has existed since 1871, it has been shown since 1872 for 
graphical reasons. 
0
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Chart 2 - S&P 500: movement since 1872 
(index 1941-1943 = 10, log scale) 
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Sources: Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Thomson Financial Datastream. 
 
A graph of this index since 1872 on a logarithmic scale (chart 2) shows that:  
 
•  over a very long period, the index of stock market prices has risen substantially; 
 
•  stock prices declined on several occasions.  The sharpest correction was observed 
between September 1929 and June 1932. 
 
The foregoing analysis suffers from the disadvantage of not taking account of the 
movement in consumer prices.  The shareholder is keen to  protect himself against the 
erosion of the purchasing power of his portfolio caused by the general rise in prices.  Some 
stylised facts can be established on the basis of a real
6 terms series (chart 3): 
 
•  stock prices show a steep upward trend; 
 
                                                                 
6   In this paper, real terms series always refer to nominal series deflated by the consumer price index (indices 
1982-1984 = 100).  
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•  after World War I,  stock  prices significantly  exceeded the straight trend line during 
three sub-periods: around 1929, in the 1960s and from the mid-1980s onwards; 
 
•  the upward deviation compared to the trend in 1929 was followed by the sharpest 
correction ever observed; prices having subsequently remained well below the trend 
until the end of the 1950s; 
 
•  the upward deviation compared to the trend observed during the 1960s led to a 
correction in the 1970s, especially in 1973 and 1974; 
 
•  finally, despite the correction in progress since 2000, prices were still, in December 
2002, appreciably above the trend.  Even more serious: never, during previous periods 
characterised by a positive deviation, had this been so great. 
 
Chart 3 - S&P 500: movement since 1872 
(in real terms
1, log scale) 
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Sources: BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
1  Deflated by the consumer price index (indices 1982-1984 = 100). 
 
In the rest of the section an attempt has been made to synthesise the main upward and 
downward periods of stock market prices, referred to by financial specialists as "bull" and 
"bear" markets respectively.  As our analysis relates to the long term, attention will be paid  
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to the variations calculated on the basis of monthly averages rather than daily data.  
Table 1 refers to stock prices in nominal terms. 
 
Table 1 - "Bear markets"
1 at least as significant as the 1987 crash 
- - (28) 60.5 December 2002 August 2000
19 July 1989 4 73.2 December 1987 August 1987
67 July 1980 23 56.6 December 1974 January 1973
21 March 1972 18 71.0 June 1970 December 1968
267 November 1958 33 15.2 June 1932 September 1929
41 January 1925 140 62.6 August 1921 December 1909
21 August 1909 14 62.3 November 1907 September 1906
17 March 1905 13 70.7 October 1903 September 1902
52 December 1900 182 57.9 August 1896 June 1881
32 February 1880 62 52.7 June 1877 May 1872
Number of 
months 
between  the 
lowest point 
and the return 
to original value
End of period 
(date of return 
to original 
value)
Number of 
months 
between peak 
and lowest 
point
Value at the 
lowest point 
(indices 
peak = 100)
Date of the 
lowest point
Start of the 
period
(peak)
- - (28) 60.5 December 2002 August 2000
19 July 1989 4 73.2 December 1987 August 1987
67 July 1980 23 56.6 December 1974 January 1973
21 March 1972 18 71.0 June 1970 December 1968
267 November 1958 33 15.2 June 1932 September 1929
41 January 1925 140 62.6 August 1921 December 1909
21 August 1909 14 62.3 November 1907 September 1906
17 March 1905 13 70.7 October 1903 September 1902
52 December 1900 182 57.9 August 1896 June 1881
32 February 1880 62 52.7 June 1877 May 1872
Number of 
months 
between  the 
lowest point 
and the return 
to original value
End of period 
(date of return 
to original 
value)
Number of 
months 
between peak 
and lowest 
point
Value at the 
lowest point 
(indices 
peak = 100)
Date of the 
lowest point
Start of the 
period
(peak)
 
Sources: Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
1  Based on the S&P 500; stock prices in nominal terms. 
 
The most recent of the significant stock market corrections which preceded  latest 
developments is that of the so-called crash of October 1987.  In August 1987 the S&P 500 
had peaked.  Following a pronounced decline, although it lasted only four months, the S&P 
had lost (in December 1987) 26.8 p.c. of its August value, and it took altogether 19 months 
before the index recovered its initial value. 
 
Since 1871, the S&P 500 has shown nine other falls as large as that of the autumn of 
1987
7.  The occurrence of a stock market crash or "bear market" is therefore not at all 
exceptional in itself, despite the above-mentioned rising trend.  Table 1 also shows other  
                                                                 
7  The stock market crashes taken into account here correspond to the following criteria: we have recourse constantly to 
the S&P 500 index (previously named Cowles index); the start of the period is a historical peak in the series of the 
S&P 500 in nominal terms; we consider stock price declines as large as the 1987 crash; we impose no time restriction in 
our definition of a stock market crash.  Mishkin and White (2002) also used what they qualify as the "universally agreed" 
stock market crashes of October 1929 and October 1987 as benchmarks for their procedure to identify stock market 
crashes.  Their procedure differs from ours on what they refer to as key factors, namely the choice of stock market index, 
the size of the collapse and the timeframe of the decline.  More explicitly, they used the DJIA for 1903 to 1940 and they 
shifted to the S&P 500 in 1946; they considered stock price declines of over 20 p.c.; and they looked at declines over five 
different time windows (one day, five days, one month, three months and one year).  
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lessons: 
 
•  the latest crash is characterised by a fall of around 40 p.c. in the S&P 500 between 
August 2000 and December 2002.  The correction is therefore already greater than 
that of the autumn of 1987 and than several other periods (notably December 1968-
June 1970); 
 
•  more significant declines than the current one have been observed only in four 
previous  periods. In t hree of these (1872-1877, 1881-1886 and 1973-1974), the 
maximum fall was however not more than 50 p.c.  Following the October 1929 crash, 
on the other hand, the fall of S&P 500 down to its lowest point (in June 1932) reached 
84.8 p.c. and it took a little over 22 years for the index to return to its original value.  
This was in November 1958; 
 
•  the downward phase of the nine previous bear market periods (since 1871) had lasted 
on average 54 months (about four and a half years).  During these same periods it took 
on average 60 months (five years) for prices to return to their initial level.  In December 
2002, the present period began only 28 months ago. 
 
In chart 4, comparison has been made between the present correction and certain “super 
bear market” periods, i.e. cases of “bear markets” entailing a correction of a size at least 
equivalent in real terms to that of the present one.   
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Chart 4 - "Super Bear markets"
1 
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Sources: BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
1   Based on the S&P 500. 
 
Since 1871, only three other super bear market periods have been identified: September 
1906-September 1928, September 1929-November 1958 and December 1968-January 
1992. 
 
These  periods are  longer than those considered in the analysis carried out in nominal 
terms: as consumer prices tend to increase over time, it takes longer for the S&P 500 to 
return to the initial level.  As a result, some super bear market periods in real terms cover 
several bear market periods in nominal terms, so that the latter are more numerous than 
the former
8. 
 
The fall in the S&P 500 observed since August 2000 follows a course close to that of the 
three preceding super bear markets in real terms.  If the current  period continues in a 
similar manner, it may be feared that the trough has not yet been reached, and the periods 
required to enable the index to reach its lowest point and then return to its preceding peak 
might be very long. First, at the low points of December 1920, June 1932 and July 1982, 
                                                                 
8   By way of example, the strong inflation of the 1970s did not allow the S&P 500 to retain its December 1968 level in real 
terms until January 1992, whereas it had reached this level again in nominal terms by March 1972. Also, the super bear 
market in real terms of the period 1968-1992 comprises three bear markets displayed by the analysis in nominal terms 
(1968-1970, 1973-1974 and 1987).  
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the S&P 500 had lost, respectively, 70, 80.6 and 63.6 p.c. of the real value which it had 
reached when it was at its previous peak, against barely 42.2 p.c. between August 2000 
and December 2002. Second, the minimum had been reached after over 14 years, nearly 
3 years and over 13 years respectively in the preceding  periods whereas in 
December 2002 a little over 2  years passed since August 2000.  Third,  in the three 
preceding periods, a long further period - respectively a little over 5 years, a little over 
26 years and nearly 8  years  -  had elapsed before the S&P 500 returned to its initial 
volume. Consequently, the total duration of the three above mentioned super bear markets 
had been respectively 22 years, a little over 29 years and a little over 23 years. 
 
Chart 5 - "Bull markets" 
(in real terms, indices low = 100) 
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Source: Shiller's  website (see footnote 5); own calculations. 
 
We also need to take a look at significant rises in the S&P 500, the so called bull markets.  
Chart 5 is devoted to a comparison, also in real terms, between the last bull market and 
the previous ones.  No criterion of the extent of the rise in the stock price index is used to 
define the bull markets.  We merely take the trough
9 of the super bear markets as their 
starting date and their subsequent peaks as the end date. 
 
                                                                 
9   The trough for the first bull market corresponds to the minimum of the real S&P 500 reached in June 1877.  
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The cumulative rise of the S&P 500 between the last low point in real terms, observed in 
July 1982, and the peak reached in August 2000 had been considerable as the index was 
multiplied by nearly eight. The bull market of the 1920s had been twice as short, and the 
real stock market price had been multiplied by only five. Other bull markets, on the other 
hand, were longer.  This was the case with the  periods extending, on the one hand, 
between June 1877 and September 1906 and, on the other hand, between June 1932 and 
December 1968. During the latter period, the real value of the S&P 500 had been 
multiplied by more than eight. 
 
The bull markets considered in chart 5 ended, more often than not, in a more or less long 
phase of stock market euphoria, generally coinciding with strong expectations of high 
future profits thanks to the spread of new technologies: railway and telegraph companies 
in 1877-1906, automobile, electrical, radio and cinema  industries in 1920-1929, 
"nifty-fifty"
10 companies such as the high-tech firms IBM and Xerox, as well as high-profile 
consumer products firms such as Coca-Cola and McDonald's in the 1950s and 1960s and, 
finally, the companies emblematic of the information a nd communication technologies 
(ICT) during the second half of the 1990s. The stock market corrections which followed 
these phases of euphoria can be explained by a downward revision of future profits. For 
example, during the first of these super bear markets, the appearance on the scene of two 
technologies competing with railways, namely mass production of motor cars and trucks, 
led to the bankruptcy of the main American railway companies by 1917. 
 
To conclude, the stock market correction observed between August 2000 and 
December 2002 is by no means exceptional either in its length or in its extent. However, 
the preceding upward movement of prices had been particularly long and impressive in 
extent. 
 
It is very tempting today to compare the "bubble” of 2000 to that of 1929. As the choice of 
starting date might  have an effect on the conclusions which might be drawn from this 
comparison, we consider two different criteria to set it: the previous extreme low point
11 for 
the real price (chart 6) and the moment  when the stock valuation deviates from its 
historical average, which is estimated at around 15 for the price-earnings ratio
12 (chart 7). 
                                                                 
10   This is a list of  50 nifty companies for which the market had high expectations at that time and that traded at very high 
price-earnings ratios (Shiller, 2000).  Siegel (1998) reported average price-earnings (P/E)  of 41.9 for these 50 stocks at 
their market peak in 1972 that he compared with an average P/E of 18.9 for the S&P 500 index. 
11   This corresponds to the starting point of the bull markets represented in chart 5. 
12   We shall review this concept in more depth in section 3 and show that the historical geometrical average of the P/E 
proved to be slightly below 15, i.e. 13.8.  
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Chart 6 - Comparison between the 1929 and 2000 bubbles 
(in real terms, indices low
1 = 100) 
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Sources: BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
1  The starting date is determined as the moment when the previous extreme low point for the real price has been reached. 
 
Chart 7 -  Comparison between the 1929 and 2000 bubbles 
(in real terms, indices low
1 = 100) 
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Sources: BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
1  Defined here by the last month when the price-earnings ratio was lower than 15.  
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From charts 6 and 7, we conclude that: 
 
-  while the rise in real prices was faster at the time of the 1929 bubble, it was also far 
less impressive; 
-  in December 2002, real prices were still far above the initial level, whatever criteria are 
used for choosing the starting date.  In June 1932, the correction brought real prices 
back to their initial level should the starting date be assumed to be the previous 
extreme low point reached in December 1920 and even barely half of their initial level 
if the last month during which the price-earnings ratio w as under 15, that is 
October 1927, is referred to.  
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2.  ARE STOCK PRICES PREDICTABLE? 
 
According to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) in finance, future stock prices cannot 
be predicted.  As Samuelson (1965) states it, "in an informationally efficient market, asset 
price changes must be unforecastable if they are properly anticipated, i.e., if they fully 
incorporate the expectations and information of all market participants".  In other words, "a 
market in which prices always fully reflect available information is called efficient" (Fama, 
1970). 
 
The question of  the  (un)predictability of stock prices in finance is closely related to the 
random walk hypothesis. Indeed, if stock prices follow a random walk, then they are 
unforecastable by definition. To illustrate this purpose, take for instance the case where 
stock prices,  t P, are explained by the following equation: 
 
  t t t P P e r m + + = -1   (1)
   
where m is a constant, called drift parameter, r the estimated autoregressive coefficient 
and  t e  is the innovation term or shock
13. If stock prices follow a random walk, it involves 
that r = 1 and the increments,  t e , must be white noise. That means that they must respect 
two conditions: absence of autocorrelation and absence of heteroskedasticity
14. 
 
The most important  condition requires that increments must be uncorrelated. Simply 
stated, if stock prices follow a random walk, this means that equation (1) is sufficient to 
explain the dynamics of  t P. Therefore, one of the most direct and easiest way to  
                                                                 
13  A shock symbolises new information available within the market. 
14  Ideally, the increments,  t e , should be independently and identically distributed with a zero-mean and  a constant 
variance (see Annex 1). In other words, the increments,  t e , do not have to be autocorrelated and heteroskedastic. In 
the literature, these conditions are often represented by the following expression:  t e  ~IID (0,s
2). However, it is often 
recognized that the assumption of identically distributed increments may not be plausible for financial asset prices, 
especially over long time spans. For example, over a two-hundred-year sample period, many developments 
(technological progress, market structure, financial innovation, etc.) may explain time-variation in volatility of many 
financial prices.  
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test the random walk hypothesis for  the stock price is to check for autocorrelation
15. 
Indeed, the presence of  autocorrelation in the increments,  t e , is mostly the  sign of an 
omitted  explanatory  variable and thus that stock prices might be predictable to some 
degree. 
 
The homoskedasticity condition, or non-heteroskedasticity in the increments, requires that 
the variance of increments is constant over time. Since this variance is used for 
determining the significance level of the explanatory variables, i.e.  1 - t P  in equation (1), this 
condition warrants an unbiased analysis over the significant variables whatever the sub-
sample considered.  Actually,  with unstable variance, the explanatory variable  Dpt-1, for 
example, may be significantly different from zero during some sub-periods but not during 
other sub-periods. 
 
We tested these conditions for the monthly series of the S&P 500 over the sample period 
January 1871 to December 2002. The results we obtained, detailed in Annex 1, confirm 
those found recently in empirical literature (Malkiel, 2003 and Shiller, 2003), i.e. a strong 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity.  Both 
standard autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity tests clearly suggest the problems of an 
omitted variable and instability of the variance in the increments. Furthermore, according to 
the stability of variance condition, if the random walk hypothesis holds for stocks returns, 
their variance should decrease linearly over time, which also seems to be slightly rejected. 
 
The rejection of the random walk hypothesis, and hence the EMH, in practice explains the 
emergence of theories, notably in macro-finance, relating the stock price to a fundamental.  
                                                                 
15  The unit root tests, which explicitely check if the coefficient r is significantly equal to one, are often confused with tests of 
the random walk hypothesis. Of course, both elements are indirectly related as we will see in section 3.4, but, by 
construction, the unit root tests are not designed to detect predicability (Campbell et al., 1997, Chapter 2).  
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3.  VALUATION INDICATORS 
 
Given the rejection of the random walk hypothesis, several studies have thus emerged in 
literature in order to detect what kind of variables may explain the fluctuations of the stock 
price, i.e. what is (are) the fundamental variable(s) of the stock price. Among potential 
candidates, the dividends or the earnings, relying on a first theory (discount dividend 
model) and the net worth, relying on a second theory (Q-theory) are in general considered. 
 
3.1  Theories underlying the fundamental to be compared with stock prices 
 
The discount dividend model (DDM) relies on the idea that a company has to generate 
earnings in order to expand in the future. As a result, it postulates that the stock price is 
equal to the sum of all discounted dividends generated by the stock. The Q-theory argues 
that the equity price of a company should reflect its balance sheet value. 
 
The observed price may then differ, sometimes significantly, from the equilibrium price 
constructed by applying the hypotheses of the underlying theory. In that case, we can 
conclude that either the observed price is not justified in the light of the theory, and that a 
correction is inevitable, or that the hypotheses used for the valuation are inappropriate 
(Wibaut, 2000). Since we consider that stock prices are mainly driven by the fluctuations of 
fundamentals, this implies that any significant gap between the current stock prices and its 
theoretical value (considered as the equilibrium value of equity) has to be viewed as a 
signal of a future correction in prices. 
 
3.1.1  Discount Dividend Model 
 
A framework for predicting the stock prices is given by the DDM, which relates the current 
stock prices to the expected discounted dividend in the long run. According to this, the 
theoretical value of a stock should therefore reflect the discounted sum of the future cash 
flows associated with the investment. These cash flows consist of dividends (i.e. the 
distributed part of earnings) and capital gains. 
 
Algebraically, the present value of the stock price may thus be represented by the 
following equation:  
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where  P is the current stock price, 
e D  is the expected dividend (per share), 
e P  is the 
expected stock price and h is the discount rate that corresponds here to a constant return 
for an investment in stocks covering the period from i to N. However, expecting stocks 
returns for long time spans is not an easy task, which is the biggest disadvantage of this 
framework. 
 
Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, this framework has received renewed interest thanks to 
the restrictions proposed by two economists. By postulating perfect competition and 
perfect substitutability between the various means of holding wealth, Gordon and Shapiro 
(1956) show that theoretical stock prices may be reduced
16 to the following expression, 
which is called the "Gordon-Shapiro formula": 
  ( )
g h
g 1 D
P t
t -
+
=                   (3) 
where  D is the current dividend (per share) and g is the assumed constant rate of growth 
of expected dividends
17.  
 
This model makes the stock price extremely sensitive to a permanent change in h.  The 
discount factor h represents the opportunity cost of the investment under consideration. 
Moreover, the stock return, h, can be broken down as the return on a risk-free asset, r   
(which is often represented by the return yielded on a bond issued by a State with a good 
credit rating), and an equity risk premium related to the features of this type of asset, s. 
 
Therefore, equation 3 becomes: 
  ( )
g s r
g 1 D
P
t
t - +
+
=     (4) 
 
By rearranging the model, it is possible to obtain another expression of equation (4): the 
dividend yield, DY defined as the ratio of the dividend per share and the stock price: 
 
g
g r
P
D
DY
t
t
t +
- +
= =
1
s
  (4') 
                                                                 
16  A detailed description of the links between the simple net return on a stock and equation (3) is given in Annex 2. 
17  Note that equation (3) holds if, and only if, h>g.  
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Moreover, when assuming that a constant fraction d of earnings (per share) Et is paid out 
as dividends, i.e.  t E t D d = , we can obtain from equation (4) the price-earnings ratio (or 
P/E); the ratio of the stock price and the earnings per share: 
  ( )
g r
g
E
P
t
t
- +
+
=
s
d 1
  (4'') 
where the term d  is known as the payout ratio.  Since dividends are the distributed part of 
the earnings, Gordon-Shapiro's theory amounts to stating that, in the long term, stock 
prices must move in line with future earnings anticipated by the agents
18. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we shall focus on the P/E as the DY proved to be a poor 
valuation indicator for the following reasons. 
 
The DY  can give  correct  signals of over- or under-valuation of stock prices when 
comparing its current value  to its  historical average if and only if  the pay-out ratio is 
constant over time. If this is not the case, in practice, investors can still get decent returns 
with a low DY, as long as they get higher capital appreciation. Therefore, the DY indicator 
will be biased. As shown in Chart 15, the pay-out ratio clearly points out a decreasing trend 
over time. In the latter half of the twentieth century, companies paid out lower dividends in 
relation to their earnings than in the past (Smithers and Wright, 2001, Brav et al., 2003); 
undistributed earnings increase companies' net worth and, hence, their ability to pay 
additional dividends in the future. Since value is made up of both current dividends and the 
capacity for future growth, low DYs are not  necessarily a sign of an overvalued stock 
market. 
                                                                 
18   Using this theoretical framework, many other specifications (or simplifications) have been proposed in empirical 
literature. For example, one model postulates that stock price fluctuations are mainly explained by movements in the 
difference between the earnings yield and the long-run interest rate.  This model described in Lander et al. (1997) is 
often called the Fed model.  The authors use a simple error correction model that predicts the return of the S&P based 
on the deviations from a presumed equilibrium between forecasted earnings yield and yields on bonds.  Wetherilt and 
Weeken (2002) show how this alternative model is actually an extension of Gordon-Shapiro's theory.  
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Chart 8 - Payout ratio: historical view 
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Sources: Shiller's website (see footnote 5), S&P; own calculations. 
 
Another disadvantage of the DY stems from the fact that dividends are not the only future 
cash flows
19. For example, these cash flows have increasingly been distributed in the form 
of share buy-backs, especially in recent years
20 (Brav et al., 2003). If a large part of cash 
flows is distributed to shareholders otherwise than via dividends, this makes the DY less 
useful as a summary statistic for valuations. 
 
3.1.2  Q-theory 
 
Average Q, formalised by Tobin (1969), is intended to capture the entire market value of 
the company (including the market value of debt) and compare it with total assets.  It can 
be expressed as follows: 
                                                                 
19   This point had already been made by Miller and Modigliani (1961) in their seminal paper on stock valuation, which states 
that the crucial series that markets should be valuing is the total flow of cash between companies and shareholders, not 
simply dividends. 
20   The most striking shift happened in the 1980s and 1990s, when significant rates of share buy-backs implied that net new 
issues were negative (Wright, 2002).  
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assets Total
s Liabilitie Equities of value Market
Q Average
+
=   (5) 
which is basically
21 the ratio of the discounted value of a company's future earnings to the 
replacement cost of its total capital stock
22. 
 
By expressing average Q as the sum of the expectations on future changes in the capital 
stock, the rate of profitability (as captured by the ratio between dividends and capital), and 
future returns, Robertson and Wright (2002) showed that there is barely any evidence that 
average Q predicts investment, some evidence that it predicts future profitability, but 
strong evidence that it predicts future returns. 
 
3.2  Data 
 
The subsection is devoted to the description of the dataset used throughout the rest of the 
paper.  In particular, we look at data on earnings and on Q. 
 
3.2.1  Earnings 
 
There are various ways of measuring earnings and most of them are subject to biases. 
Two major sources of differences in estimating earnings can be considered: differences in 
accounting concepts and differences in the estimation period. 
 
As regard differences in the accounting concepts, as reported earnings are officially 
communicated to the Securities and Exchange Commission and audited in accordance 
with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. They are more reliable than unaudited 
earnings such as operating earnings and pro forma earnings (S&P, 2002). It is no surprise 
that operating earnings constantly exceeded as reported earnings, so that P/E based on 
operating earnings appeared lower and thus less worrying in recent years than P/E based 
on as reported earnings. As with as reported earnings, some differences appear, 
depending on the data providers. 
 
As regards differences in the estimation period, some authors resort to anticipated 
earnings while others use observed earnings. 
 
                                                                 
21   If average Q exceeds one, then the company can increase earnings by investing. 
22  Fixed capital is generally evaluated at the market price (financial concept) which can differ from the accounting concept.  
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Among the latter category of authors, some make their analysis on the basis of earnings 
for the last year, others on the basis of smoothed earnings, i.e. earnings calculated on the 
basis of an average of observations over the last ten years.  This version has the 
advantage of smoothing out fluctuations in earnings due to temporary events and business 
cycles (Shen, 2000).  Earnings  tend to be cyclical, but a ten-year period does not 
necessarily coincide with the fluctuating duration of cycles.  Moreover, as real earnings 
tend to increase over time, average earnings over ten years tend to be lower than the 
earnings of the most recent year, so that P/Es calculated on an average of earnings are 
usually higher than P/Es calculated on last year's earnings. 
 
Authors of the former category (Lander et al., 1997) suggest adopting forward earnings. 
The advantage of forward earnings is that these series remain closest to the behaviour of 
investors who work out their investment strategy on the basis of expectations concerning 
the future behaviour of the markets.  However, these forward earnings are supposed to 
anticipate operating earnings ( which, themselves, are not fully reliable; see supra) and 
they tend to be upward biased
23 (even when compared to last year's operating earnings).  
Forward P/Es therefore tend to give the false impression that stock prices are cheaper 
than they really are.  
 
The earnings per share (E
24) used in the paper are, according to Shiller (2000, op. cit.), the 
observed four-quarters trailing
25 as reported earnings published by S&P.  This data  is 
available on Shiller's website
26. 
 
                                                                 
23   Wadhwani (1999) and Panigirtzoglou and Scammel (2002). 
24  In the rest of the paper, E shall stand for earnings per share. 
25   For the months of March, June, September and December, E is the sum of the earnings per share of the last four 
quarters. The E data for the other months is obtained by linear interpolation. 
26   See footnote 5.  
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3.2.2  Q 
 
Recourse to average Q as a predictor of future stock price movements has been recently 
underlined by Smithers and Wright (2001).  These authors propose another measure of Q 
which they labelled as "equity Q", defined as: 
 
 
Worth Net
Equities of Value Market
Q Equity =    (6) 
 
This definition is in line with the ratio published regularly in the company balance sheets 
produced alongside the Federal Reserve's flow of funds accounts.  These figures can be 
found on an annual and a quarterly basis for all quoted and unquoted non-financial 
companies. 
 
Equity Q has the same properties, with respect to the impact of changes in each of its 
components, as average Q.  Thus, a rise in the value of debt increases both ratios, other 
things being equal.  A value of 1 for Equity Q will also imply a value of 1 in average Q 
definition. In our further analysis, Equity Q is preferred over average Q because this ratio 
relaxes the strong assumption according to which the market value of a  company is 
unaffected by its method of financing
27 (Smithers and Wright, 2001). Another advantage of 
Equity Q is that it can be constructed without recourse to capital stock data at market 
prices, for which the availability is far from easy (Wright, 2002). 
  
We can also express Equity Q per share, so that equation (6) becomes: 
 
 
t
t
NW
P
Q Equity =   (7) 
where NW stands for Net Worth per share. 
 
According to the theory, the mean value of Q, if we could measure it properly, should be 
precisely parity ( in the case of perfect competition) or somewhat above ( in the case of 
imperfect competition).  As Smithers and Wright (2001) maintain, in a world of imperfect 
statistics, Equity Q has an average below  parity.  Lower mean values are explained by 
Wright (2002) by a systematic tendency to over-estimate the replacement value of the 
                                                                 
27   This assumption holds only under Miller-Modigliani conditions, in particular the absence of company failures (Wright, 
2002).  
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physical capital stock, on account of the fact that economic depreciation may occur at a 
more rapid rate than recorded depreciation. 
 
Pickford et al. (2002) constructed a monthly proxy for Q using S&P 500 data. In this paper, 
this series will be referred to as Q.  Contrary to Equity Q, Q  series therefore includes 
financial companies and is limited to the 500 companies comprised in the S&P 500 index.  
It makes it easy to compare Q with P/E. In building this Q series, Pickford et al. (2002, op. 
cit.) assume that the mis-measurement of depreciation discussed above has an important 
impact on attempts to derive the estimated net worth of US quoted companies from their 
published retained earnings, but that the impact is relatively stable over time. This method 
accordingly measures net worth taking into account an "average" degree of mis-statement 
of earnings
28. Hence, recorded earnings were scaled down by an amount that makes Q 
equal to 1 on average. 
 
Besides the difficulty  of measuring the rate of capital depreciation, Q  faces a nother 
well-known measurement problem
29. Indeed, capital stock is not measured directly: only 
the change in the capital stock can be measured. 
 
In the rest of the paper, we have made use of the Q series available on the Smithers and 
Co website
30 as of January 2003. The series ends on July 2002 (latest available data) as 
we were not able to update the dataset built by Smithers' team. 
 
3.3.  Descriptive analysis 
 
3.3.1  An initial look at the valuation of stock prices 
 
We can gain an initial idea of the current (and past) valuation of stock prices by 
considering the ratios between the current stock price and the value of the corresponding 
fundamental at a given moment (E or NW, depending on the case), and comparing them 
with their historical average
31. 
 
                                                                 
28   Pickford et al. (2002, op. cit.) further claim that it will not therefore make any allowance for the exceptional mis-statement 
of earnings that has occurred in recent years.  Details of the method used for building the Q series are given in Pickford 
et al. (2002). 
29   These problems apply for Q data in all countries, even in the United States.  Outside the United States, high quality net 
worth statistics over a long period simply do not yet exist. For the United Kingdom, see Smithers and Wright (2001) and 
MacGorain and Thompson (2002). For Japan, see Ogawa and Kitasaka (1995) and Smithers and Wright (2001). 
30   http:\\www.valuingwallstreet.com\updates.shtml. 
31   Another way of approaching stock valuation, in the case of the fundamentals used in Gordon-Shapiro’s formula, is to 
compare the stock price with the theoretical price resulting from equation 4.  This method, presented by Wetherilt and 
Weeken (2002), among others, requires  estimating the theoretical price based on assumptions regarding earnings 
growth (g) and the equity risk premium (s).  
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This approach has its disadvantages: the choice of the historical benchmark is actually not 
uncontroversial.  Some commentators have argued that historical relationships may have 
broken down and that long-term averages - such as those calculated by Shiller since 1871 
- may therefore no longer be appropriate benchmarks (Wetherilt and Weeken, 2002, op. 
cit.).  
 
For practical reasons, the aforementioned approach has been used in the current section. 
We consider either upward or downward deviations from the average as significant if they 
exceed 25 p.c. in absolute value. 
 
  a.  Price-earnings 
 
Over the period 1871–2002 as a whole, the P/E calculated for stocks in the S&P 500 
averaged 13.8.   
 
Chart 9 - Price-earnings ratio on the S&P 500: historical view 
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Sources: Shiller's website (see footnote 5), S&P, Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
The black thick horizontal lines represent a fluctuation margin of ± 25 p.c.  
 
Between 1871 and 1995, whenever the P/E significantly exceeded its historical average 
(e.g., when it was higher than 20), corrections occurred sooner or later; on each occasion, 
13.8 
Average  
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not only did the P/E revert to its mean, but an over-reaction ensued, with the P/E then 
remaining below its historical value. Similarly, when the P/E fell substantially short of its  
historical average (e.g. by dropping below 10), it returned sooner or later to its long-term 
average, then over-reacted, sometimes overshooting the average to a significant degree. 
 
Since 1995, the P/E has reached historical peaks, with prices sometimes reaching 47 
times E in March 2002. The P/E subsequently dropped back to around 29 in December so 
that the extent of the overvaluation, as measured on the basis of a historical P/E, scaled 
back to 105 p.c. This value nevertheless surpasses anything seen in the 1871-1995 
period. When Alan Greenspan
32 issued his warning about the "irrational exuberance" of 
the stock markets in December 1996, prices stood at just 19 times E. 
 
  b.  Q 
 
Q is shown for the period January 1872  - July 2002  period in chart 10.  The historical 
average is slightly
33 above 1. Q reached a peak in December 1999 which is far beyond the 
25 p.c. upward bound,  and a sharp correction followed. In July 2002, the extent of 
overvaluation as measured on the basis of Q, came back to around 25 p.c. above its 
mean. 
 
Chart 10 - Q: historical view 
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Source: Smithers and Co website (see footnote 30); own calculations. 
The black thick horizontal lines represent a fluctuation margin of ± 25 p.c. 
                                                                 
32   Greenspan (1996). 
33   The average is above 1, probably because the scaling down process took place over a slightly shorter period. 
1.05 
Average  
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  c.  First conclusions on stock market valuation 
 
In the 1990s, whatever the fundamental considered,  both valuation ratios moved 
substantially away from their long-term averages, and such deviations had never been that 
large in the past.  This prompted some commentators to suggest that equity prices could 
not depart for much longer from their historical relationships with the fundamentals and 
therefore needed to fall.  
  
In December 2002, the P/E still showed a significant overvaluation of equity prices when 
compared to their historical average, but since July 2002 the overvaluation was not that 
important in the case of Q. 
 
The evidence is even more mixed if, for each valuation indicator, we compare the latest 
data (those from December 2002) with their average over the last ten years instead of their 
historical average.  We might then conclude either that the stocks are no longer 
overvalued (on the basis of Q) or that, though still overvalued, they are much less 
overvalued (on the basis of P/E). 
 
Table 2  - Sensitivity of the valuation indicators to the time horizon chosen for the 
average 
Indicator  Value in December 
2002 
Average 
1871-2002 
Average 
1993-2002 
       
P/E  28.5  13.8  24.5 
       
Q  1.32
1  1.05  1.74 
Sources:  Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Smithers and Co website (see footnote 30), S&P, Thomson Financial 
Datastream; own calculations. 
1  24 July 2002 (latest data available). 
 
In the Gordon-Shapiro framework, a higher value for the average over the last ten years 
than for the historical average can be justified on the basis of equations (4") (section 3.1.1) 
by a lower equity risk premium, a lower real risk-free interest rate or a higher growth rate.  
This third factor relates to New Economy arguments that expectations of higher 
productivity growth and output growth resulting from the increased usage of ICT supported 
rapidly rising stock prices in the late 1990s.  
 
With this reservation in mind, we shall keep the 1871-2002 average as the benchmark for 
the rest of the article.  
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3.3.2  Do the valuation indicators send the right signal about stock market prices? 
 
We can expect a good valuation indicator to give the right signals about future price 
movements.    In particular,  we can hope that it will identify all the major turning points 
(maxima and minima), but also that it will not give out incorrect signals.   
 
a.  Identification of major turning points 
 
Focusing the analysis on major turning points, we investigate whether valuation indicators 
would have enabled us to spot the "super bear" and bull markets described in section 1.   
 
In order to answer this question, we compare the turning points in the valuation indicators 
and in the real stock prices.  These are shown in chart 11.   
 
The turning points in the real S&P 500 correspond to the starting dates of the bull and 
super bear markets considered in section 1.  They therefore present an alternation of 
troughs and peaks, delimiting four long cycles.   
 
The turning points in the valuation indicators are defined in relation to the turning points in 
the real stock price. They are given by the moment when the valuation indicators reach a 
maximum (or a minimum) in the period comprising the turning point in the real P, during 
which the valuation indicators constantly deviate from their historical average by more than 
25 p.c.
34  This procedure identifies a turning point for each valuation indicator next to a 
turning point in the real P, except for the P/E which could not signal the super bear market 
starting in 1906
35.  Hence, we could identify eight turning points for the real P and for Q 
and seven for P/E. 
                                                                 
34  For example, the turning point for P/E relative to the August 2000 maximum in the real S&P 500 has been defined as 
follows.  First, we select the period during which the P/E exceeded constantly its historical average by 25 p.c. or more.  
This has been the case between November 1995 and December 2002.  Over this period, we then pick up the 
maximum value for P/E.  This has been reached in March 2002, moment when it was worth 3.4 times its historical 
average.  Thus, this turning point for P/E lagged 19 months behind the turning point for the real P.  That also means 
that the signal of overvaluation was not yet fully given at the time the correction of the real S&P 500 started. 
35   In September of that year, even the P/E did not show any overvaluation as it was below its historical average.  See 
table 3 below.  
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Table 3 shows the moment of the turning point in the real S&P 500, the moment of the 
associated turning point in the valuation indicators, the value of each indicator at their 
turning point as well as at the time of the turning points in the real S&P 500 and, finally, the 
leads or lags of the valuation indicator turning points. 
 
Comparing the timing of the turning points between the valuation indicators and the stock 
prices in real terms, the P/E leads in 2 out of 7 cases
36 and lags in 1 and the differences 
range from -19 to 36 months, while Q leads in 3 out of 8 cases and lags in 1 and the 
differences range from -1 to 35 months. 
 
A non-parametric test performed by Banerji
37, called Randomization test, can be used to 
check whether turning points in the valuation indicators lead turning points in the real P 
and, more importantly, whether these leads are statistically significant.  Because of the 
missing data for P/E in relation to the September 1906 peak in stock price, the test has 
been applied only for Q. 
 
In the Randomization test, the null hypothesis that the leads of Q over the real P are not 
statistically significant is tested against the alternative hypothesis that the leads in Q are 
significantly greater than zero month. The results display a confidence level of 87.5 p.c. for 
the rejection of the null hypothesis for the whole 1871-2002 period which comprises the 
eight turning points. 
 
On the basis of this result, if we accept that the leads of Q over the real P are significantly 
greater than zero month, it might be interesting to find out how much greater than zero 
month the leads are likely to be. The Randomization test can therefore be conducted for 
increasing lead span, giving the confidence level at which the null hypothesis is rejected in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis that the leads at turns significantly exceed one, two, 
.... months. The full set of confidence levels results in a "lead profile", to use Banerji's 
terminology.   
 
                                                                 
36   Whereas the super bear market starting in September 1906 was signaled by Q with a lead of eight months, P/E did not 
show any sign of a major overvaluation in September 1906 or even before.  Some years beforehand, we could have 
detected overvaluation of the real S&P 500 on the basis of P/E but this signal should have disappeared as this valuation 
indicator was below even its historical average when the real P reached their high. 
37   See Banerji (2000) for a full description of the test and for a first application to evaluate survey series as leading 
indicators at business cycle troughs.  Also see Van Haelen et al. (2000) for a first application of the test inside the 
National Bank of Belgium and an extension to peaks and troughs.  
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The lead profile of Q on real P is depicted in chart 12. The main results are that the null 
hypothesis of a lead of at most 1 month can be rejected at a confidence level of 87.5 p.c. 
and that the confidence level decreases with the duration of the leads. 
 
Chart 12  - Lead profile of Q in relation to the real stock price 
(per cent
1) 
 
 
Sources:  BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Smithers and Co website (see footnote 30), S&P, Thomson Financial 
Datastream; own calculations. 
1  The chart shows the confidence level for different durations of leads, i.e. the probability that the null hypothesis of no 
lead can be rejected for the indicated number of months. 
 
Another key feature expected from a useful valuation indicator is that it should at least 
point out that the stocks are overvalued at the point when they attained their maximum 
value. Except for the above mentioned 1906 period for P/E, in all other cases the valuation 
indicators were more than 25 p.c. above their historical average at the time when  P 
reached  is turning point in real terms. Thus, without giving an exact indication of the 
moment when the bubbles would reach their maximum, the indicators usually  signalled 
that stocks were clearly overvalued, so that the ensuing severe corrections appeared 
justified in terms of stock market valuation. All the indicators show that the 2000 bubble is 
considerably larger than the ones which caused the preceding super bear markets.   
 
b.   False signals 
 
Some valuation indicators not only failed to warn the markets in time, but also alerted them 
unnecessarily.  On a number of occasions, P/E has reached extremely high values (more 
Months  
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than 25 p.c. above the historical average) w ithout any subsequent significant market 
correction. This was the case in December 1921, in July 1933 and, to some extent, in 
January 1992 (see chart 11).  On each occasion, these movements can be explained by 
the extreme volatility of E.  The primary, but by no means the only, reason why E are 
volatile is that they are highly dependent on the state of the economy. When the economy 
goes into recession, E tend to fall more than proportionally, so that P/E might rise rather 
than fall, whereas the other valuation indicators either fall or rise at a slower pace.  In 
December 1921 and in January 1992, investors who refrained from buying a basket of 
American stocks would have missed most of the 1920s and 1990s bull markets 
respectively. 
 
Generally speaking, Q appears to have given the right signals. However, contrary to P/E, it 
failed to anticipate the 1987 crash. Since that crash was short-lived, some people might 
regard this as a sign of reliability rather than weakness. 
 
3.3.3  Are misalignments in the valuation indicators corrected by stock price 
changes? 
 
Another descriptive analysis can be performed at this stage.  It aims to check whether any 
misalignment of a valuation indicator in relation to its historical average tends to be 
corrected via changes in price (P) or via changes in fundamentals
38 (F). These changes 
are considered in real terms. We therefore examine the respective contributions of the real 
P and the real F to the extreme variations in the valuation indicators. An extreme variation 
means a variation over a period which may vary in length, linking a low point to a high 
point, and vice versa; in addition, these high and low points have to deviate by more than 
25 p.c. from the historical average. 
 
First, we shall identify the extremes (turning points) and hence the extreme variations to be 
taken into consideration for both indicators (P/E and Q).  Next, we shall use charts, in 
particular, to check whether the upward or downward movements in these indicators can 
be explained by either variations in real P or variations in real F or both. 
 
Using the ratios between  each valuation indicator under review and its corresponding 
historical average, illustrated in chart 11, we can identify some extremes and link them 
together (chart 13).  The selection of the valuation indicators turning points differs from that  
                                                                 
38  Fundamentals are E and NW. They are expressed per share.  
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of the preceding section.  Here, criteria are applied to define the best turning points
39 for  
the valuation indicators whereas, in the preceding section, we tried to find turning points in 
relation to turning points in the real P identified in a first step. 
 
Chart 13  - Extreme values of the ratios between the valuation indicators
1 and their 
historical average 
 
Sources:  Shiller's website (see footnote 5 ), Smithers and Co website (see footnote  30), S&P, Thomson Financial 
Datastream; own calculations. 
 
Chart 13 teaches us a number of things. 
 
•  We find more extremes for P/E (17) than for Q (11).  This difference reflects the greater 
volatility of P/E.  
•  This alternation of more frequent extremes in the case of P/E is valid only for the 
period from December 1917 to June 1946; period which also featured a greater 
frequency of extremes for Q. 
•  With the exception of September 1929 and June 1932 when both indicators recorded 
an extreme high and an extreme low point respectively, the timing of the extremes 
differs from one indicator to another. However, except for the period from 1917 to 
1946, the general trends were the same for both indicators. 
 
                                                                 
39   We impose the alternation of extremes marking overvaluation and undervaluation. As a first step in the selection of 
extremes, we did not impose such alternation. In this case, it appeared that for each valuation indicator, there were 
several successive extreme high points causing the valuation indicators to deviate upwards by more than 25 p.c. When 
the alternation of extremes is imposed, we take only the one with the highest value.  
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By pinpointing the extremes in the chart, we can define some episodes. We shall consider 
an episode as comprising successive extreme upward and downward movements in the 
indicators, thus linking one low point with the next. For example, in the case of the P/E, the 
first episode covers the period from November 1873 to December 1917, during which – 
starting from a low point – the P/E reached a peak (in December 1894) before dropping 
back to another low point. We thus identify eight episodes in the case of P/E and five for Q. 
 
The episodes
40, explained in the tables in Annex 3, are represented in chart 14 by an 
arrow linking two points. They consist of upward movements (grey dots) followed by 
downward movements in the valuation indicators ( black dots),  a small black circle 
symbolising the  latest downward movement
41.  For a given extreme rise or fall in a 
valuation indicator, each dot gives the variation in the real P (vertical axis) and the 
variation in the real F (horizontal axis).   
 
The intersection of the axes enables us to define four quadrants: in the North-West, P is 
rising in real terms and the real value of F is falling; in the North-East, both the value of P 
and F are rising in real terms; conversely, both are falling in the South-West; and finally, in 
the South-East, real P is falling while F is rising in real terms. 
 
The slope of the arrows is a crucial element for the analysis. The more vertical the arrows, 
the greater the extent to which the extreme variations in the valuation indicators can be 
attributed to variations in prices (in real terms). Conversely, the more horizontal the arrows, 
the greater the extent to which the extreme variations in these indicators can be explained 
by variations in  F (in real terms).  Finally, an oblique arrow tends to indicate that the 
variable causing the extreme rise in a valuation indicator contributes only partially to its 
subsequent correction. 
 
                                                                 
40   Whatever the valuation indicator considered, there are wide variations in the duration of the episodes and the upward  
and downward movements which they comprise. For example, in the case of the P/E, disregarding the latest correction, 
the shortest movement barely lasted 11 months (upward movement in episode 5) and the longest lasted for 23 years 
(downward movement in episode 1). 
41   The latest episode ended in July 2002 for the Q series.  
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Chart 14  - Factors explaining extreme rises and falls in the valuation indicators 
      (p.c. change over the periods considered) 
 
Sources:  BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Smithers & Co website (see footnote 30), S&P, Thomson Financial 
Datastream; own calculations. 
 
Comparison of both sides of the chart 14 reveals the following: 
•  For Q, a rise in the S&P 500 of more than 200 p.c. in real terms has always contributed 
to extreme rises in this valuation indicator. Similarly, extreme falls in this indicator have 
always involved a price correction of more than 40 p.c. in real terms. 
•  Upward movements in the P/E have not always been accompanied by rising P in real 
terms. Thus, the real value of the stocks increased by less than 100 p.c. during 
episodes 1, 5 and 6, covering periods from November 1873 to December 1894, and 
from November 1937 to December 1941, and the period starting on this last date and 
ending in June 1946.  Moreover, stocks actually lost almost 15 p.c. of their real value 
during the second upward movement in the P/E (South-East quadrant); this happened 
between December 1917 and December 1921.  
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•  Similarly, downward movements in the P/E have not always been accompanied by a 
price correction. Thus, between December 1921 and October 1923, the drop in the P/E 
occurred even though P rose by almost 10 p.c. in real terms (North-East quadrant). 
•  Variations in real E have often been much greater than the variations in the real value 
of NW
42. 
•  Falls in NW have rarely contributed to the extreme rises in Q. In fact, during four out of 
five episodes, Q showed a steep rise despite a  rise in the real value of  NW.  In 
contrast, in the case of the P/E, a sometimes substantial fall in real E contributed to 
extreme upward movements in this indicator in six of the eight episodes considered, 
and E rose by only 4.3 p.c. in real terms during the seventh episode (between June 
1949 and December 1961). 
•  In general, a rise in the real value of F contributed to the extreme falls in the valuation 
indicators. The exceptions comprise a fall of 0.3 p.c. in  NW  and  of 58.2 p.c. in  E 
between September 1929 and June 1932 (respectively, second episode for Q and third 
episode for P/E). 
•  If we combine the previous two findings, the real value of  NW tended to increase 
steadily, regardless of the movement in the real value of P
43.  The extreme variations in 
Q were therefore caused more by extreme variations in P.  
•  The extreme variations in P/E were also influenced by extreme variations in E. 
•  Whatever the valuation indicator considered, the variables behind the rise were usually 
those which brought about the correction.  In the case of Q, this variable was P. In the 
case of the P/E, E also played a part. When the fall in E contributed to the rise in the 
P/E, they subsequently always increased, and sometimes to a considerable extent, 
thus making a sometimes significant contribution to the fall in the P/E. Symmetrically, 
after the sharp rise in real E between October 1923 and September 1929 (episode 3), 
E collapsed between September 1929 and June 1932. 
•  The  latest extreme episode features the steepest stock price rise in  real terms, 
whatever the valuation indicator considered.  That rise was accompanied by a rise in 
the real value of NW, but a fall in real E. The most recent and most dramatic sub-
period of the rise in the P/E, namely 1995-2002 (table 4), comprised two successive 
moments where the characteristics were very different. Between January 1995 and 
August 2000, the rise in the P/E (from 15 to 28) was due solely to soaring P, which 
rose by around 177.7 p.c., while during the same period E increased by 47.8 p.c.  Real 
P and E peaked in August 2000. Between August 2000 and March 2002, a slump in 
                                                                 
42   The chart on the left is in fact wider than the one on the right. 
43   Grey and black dots located to the right of the vertical axis.  
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real E
44 (-55.1 p.c.) was the only factor contributing to the rise in the P/E (pushing it 
from 28 to 47).  P had in fact already started to fall (-24.9 p.c.). 
 
Table 4 -  Changes in P/E over the January 1995-December 2002 period: breakdown 
according to changes in real P and real E 
26.3 -23.0 -39.3 28.5 December 2002 46,7 March 2002
-55.1 -24.9 67.0 46.7 March 2002 28,0 August 2000
47.8 177.7 87.9 28.0 August 2000 14,9 January 1995
(percentage change over the periods 
considered)
Change in 
real E
Change in 
real P
Change in 
P/E
Final 
P/E
End Initial 
P/E
Start
26.3 -23.0 -39.3 28.5 December 2002 46,7 March 2002
-55.1 -24.9 67.0 46.7 March 2002 28,0 August 2000
47.8 177.7 87.9 28.0 August 2000 14,9 January 1995
(percentage change over the periods 
considered)
Change in 
real E
Change in 
real P
Change in 
P/E
Final 
P/E
End Initial 
P/E
Start
 
Sources: BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), S&P, Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
 
The latest extreme downward movement in the valuation indicators is due primarily to a 
correction in real P, but also – in the case of P/E and Q – to a rise in the real value of F.  
Annex 4 suggests that  E could continue to recover, and hence contribute to the still 
necessary downward adjustment in the P/E. 
                                                                 
44   In real terms, as reported E showed, between September and March 2002, the third largest fall since 1871 (-55.3 p.c.).  
38  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 41 - NOVEMBER 2003 
3.4  Empirical analysis 
 
The  predictability of stock prices poses the challenge of  finding fundamentals for 
forecasting them. This sub-section shall examine the respective qualities of the t wo 
fundamentals considered  –  earnings and net worth  - as suggested by the theories 
presented in section 3.1. 
 
3.4.1  Univariate and multivariate analyses 
 
The fundamental used for forecasting stock prices must fulfil two criteria. The first is that 
the fundamental and the stock price must hold a durable relationship over time (mean-
reversion criterion). The second criterion requires that the valuation indicator can predict 
the future movements in stock prices (causality criterion). 
 
a.  Mean-reversion 
 
An important criterion for assessing the predictive power of a valuation indicator is that the 
ratio of price to fundamental (P/F) must mean-revert. This justifies the importance of the 
historical average and the significance of any misalignment between this ratio and its 
historical average. If an indicator does not tend to revert to its mean, it is useless to 
observe that it is deviating from its mean because we shall not be able to state that the 
ratio shows an over- or undervaluation.  
 
An initial way of looking at the mean-reverting properties of any valuation indicator is to 
closely track its movement over time and to compare it to its average.  A mean-reverting 
indicator regularly gets pulled back from extreme values - whether high or low - towards its 
mean.  Its average value is an attractor.  This means that when it takes a very high value, 
there is a high probability that it will fall back significantly. 
 
From econometric point of view, the mean-reversion criterion  implicitly involves two 
conditions. First, each variable, i.e. P and F, must be proved to be integrated of the same 
order, which means they have to display the same degree of non stationarity. Second, a 
cointegrated relationship  must exist  between them. This means that whatever the 
instability of P and F separately, the link between them should be stable. Simply stated, if 
these variables are cointegrated, then they move together over time.  If both tests hold, 
then any ratio relating both variables will be stationary and considered as a useful indicator  
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for predicting future movements in P or in F. Traditionally, these conditions are tested in 
literature through the unit root tests and the cointegration tests.  
 
For testing unit root process in each variable, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF test) 
were performed whose results are reported in Table 5. The sample period, here as in the 
following of the sections 3.4.1. and 3.4.2, is from February 1872 to July 2002
45. 
 
Table 5 - Unit Root Tests based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics 
(February 1872 -July 2002) 
 
Variables in log  Level  First-difference 
     
Real P  -1.373  -10.55** 
Real E  -1.972  -9.790** 
Real NW  3.610  -10.69** 
     
Ratios     
P/E  -3.539**  - 
Q  -3.696**  - 
 
Sources:  BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Smithers and Co website (see footnote 30), S&P, Thomson Financial 
Datastream; own calculations. 
Note:  Tests performed using ADF tests with a maximum of 12 lags. Critical values are -2.86 and -3.44 at respectively 5 p.c. 
and 1 p.c. of significance level. * and ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at respectively 5 p.c. and 
1 p.c. of significance level. 
 
As suggested by these results, the stock price, and each potential fundamental taken 
separately, in real terms, contain a unit root in level, i.e. r=1 in equation (1) in section 2, 
but are first-difference stationary. From  Table  5, we can indeed note that the null 
hypothesis of unit root is accepted for all the variables in level but strongly rejected when 
these variables are defined in first-difference. In other words, all these variables taken 
separately display a I(1) process. Moreover, the existence of a cointegrated relationship 
between the stock price and each fundamental was tested by using standard Johansen's 
cointegration tests (Juselius and Johansen, 1990, Johansen, 1992)
46.  The cointegration 
analysis (not reported  here) suggests that there exists one cointegrated vector between 
the real P and the real E on the one hand and between the real P and the real NW on the 
other hand
47. Thus, the relationship between the stock price and each potential 
fundamental is stable over time, and hence cointegrated. These results are confirmed by 
                                                                 
45  Our dataset covers the period from January 1871 to December 2002 (for the earnings) and from January 1871 to July 
2002 (for the net worth). Given that and the number of 12 lags used for the tests, we determined a common sample, i.e. 
February 1872 to July 2002.   
46  Contrary to the unit root tests which use the single equation framework, the Johansen's tests use the vector error 
correction model (VECM). 
47  Standard lag order testing procedures suggest a VAR representation with two lags, i.e. VAR(2), for the model using as 
fundamental E in real terms, but a VAR representation with five lags, i.e. VAR(5), for the model based on NW in real 
terms, see Annex 5.  
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the results of the unit root tests for each valuation indicator (Table 5), which suggest 
stationarity. 
 
Therefore, at this stage both potential models - P/E and Q -  could be considered as 
equivalent from the statistical point of view in the sense that they both respect the mean-
reversion criterion.  
 
b.  Causality 
 
Given this mean-reversion criterion, economic theory could indeed predict that a valuation 
indicator will mean-revert at some point, but not the path or the channel through which the 
correction will appear.  Therefore, to be useful, a valuation indicator should be able to say 
something about the future movements in stock prices.  In that sense, mean reversion is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition.  Additionally, this indicator must be a leading 
indicator of changes in the level of the stock market.  A high value of P/F should indicate 
not just that the ratio is likely to fall, but that this will come about via stock price changes. 
 
In order to check this assumption, we follow a simple methodology
48. Given the existence 
of the cointegration relationship, a variable of each cointegrated vector at least has to 
adjust to go back to the long term equilibrium following a specific shock, as suggested by 
the Granger theorem
49. 
 
According to this, if the long term equilibrium is restored through a stock price correction, 
this implies that the cointegration  residual has forecasting power for the short-term 
variation of P. The results for both models are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
                                                                 
48   A similar exercise is applied to the estimation of American and Belgian private consumption functions in respectively 
Lettau et al. (2001) and Eugène et al. (2003). 
49   See Granger et al. (1974) and Enders (1995), chapter 6.  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 41 - NOVEMBER 2003  41 
Table 6 - Estimation  of the impact of the cointegration residuals on short term 
variations of P and E for several horizons 
 
Dependent variable  ￿
=
D
T
1 t
ln (Pt+T)  ￿
=
D
T
1 t
ln (Et+T) 
Number of months 
(T) 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(t-Stat) 
R
2 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(t-Stat) 
R
2 
1  -0.001 
(-0.47) 
0.00  0.005 
(1.15) 
0.00 
         
3 
-0.010 
(-0.98) 
0.00 
0.023 
(1.78) 
0.01 
         
6 
-0.018 
(-0.94) 
0.00 
0.062 
(2.42) 
0.03 
         
12 
-0.053 
(-1.47) 
0.00 
0.150 
(3.25) 
0.06 
         
24 
-0.101 
(-1.83) 
0.01 
0.261 
(3.79) 
0.08 
         
36 
-0.113 
(-1.56)  0.01 
0.363 
(4.13)  0.11 
 
Sources:  BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), S&P, Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
Note: Ordinary least squares estimation.  The t -Stat between parentheses is based on corrected standard  deviations 
following Newey and West (1987) methodology. Significant coefficients of 5 p.c. are in bold. 
 
Concerning the P/E model, it appears that the cointegration residual has no forecasting 
power for the P growth rate since the estimated coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero and the adjusted R
2  statistics is close to zero. At most, the results from Table 6 
suggest that the cointegration residual of the P/E model can predict the growth rate  of E 
from a 3-month horizon onwards. This means that the value of P/E is also influenced by 
variations of E, which confirms the results presented in chart 14. 
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Table 7 - Estimation of the impact of the cointegration residuals on short term 
variations of P and NW for several horizons 
 
Dependent variable  ￿
=
D
T
1 t
ln (Pt+T)  ￿
=
D
T
1 t
ln (NWt+T) 
Number of months 
(T) 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(t-Stat) 
R
2 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(t-Stat) 
R
2 
1  -0.005 
(-1.60) 
0.00  0.000 
(0.88) 
0.00 
         
3 
-0.022 
(-2.29) 
0.01 
0.002 
(1.04) 
0.01 
         
6 
-0.047 
(-2.72) 
0.02 
0.003 
(1.03) 
0.00 
         
12 
-0.112 
(-3.82) 
0.04 
0.006 
(1.18) 
0.00 
         
24 
-0.214 
(-5.04) 
0.09 
0.011 
(2.20) 
0.02 
         
36 
-0.291 
(-5.64)  0.11 
0.017 
(2.80)  0.03 
 
Sources:  BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Smithers and Co website (see footnote 30), S&P, Thomson Financial 
Datastream; own calculations. 
Note: Ordinary least squares estimation. The t -Stat between parentheses is based on corrected standard  deviations 
following Newey and West (1987) methodology. Significant coefficients of 5 p.c. are in bold. 
 
On the other hand, the results from Table 7 suggest a better performance for the Q model. 
The cointegration residual does indeed have forecasting power for the growth rate of P 
from a 3-month horizon onwards, which increases over the time span. The cointegration 
residual has no forecasting power for the NW growth rate, except maybe for the 2- and 
3-year horizons. 
 
It thus seems that the relationship between stock prices and each kind of indicator is not 
straightforward and clear-cut since the stock price and the fundamental influence each 
other. That is especially true for the P/E model. Indeed, the expected causality relationship 
is only checked for the Q model while, for the P/E model, the stock price and the earnings 
influence each other. This points out, for example, that the sole use of the P/E indicator for 
forecasting the stock price may be questionable, especially in a univariate framework. 
Therefore, we estimate the stock price in a multivariate model
50. 
 
                                                                 
50   The weak exogeneity test suggests similar conclusions.  
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3.4.2  The models 
 
Two distinct models are considered: the P/E model and the Q model.  
 
For the  estimation exercise, we choose a  vector  error correction model (VECM) for 
estimating and simulating the stock price for two specific periods. The intuition behind 
- and the  general features of  -  the VECM   framework are discussed in more details in 
Annex 5.  
 
Each model consists of a system of two equations where each dependent variable is a 
function of its past own values,  of the past values of the other variable and of the 
corresponding cointegrating vector. Both equations have the same structure of lags
51. In 
other words: 
 
-  In the P/E model, the dependent variable for the first equation is the real P, which is a 
function of its past values and of the past values of E, plus a constant term and a shock. 
The dependent variable for the second equation is E in real terms, which is a function of 
its past values and of the past values of P plus a constant term and a shock. For the 
P/E model, the number of lags chosen is 12 months; 
-  In the Q model, the dependent variable for the first equation is the real P, which is a 
function of its past values and of the past values of NW in real terms, plus a constant 
term and a shock. The dependent variable for the second equation is the NW, which is 
a function of the past values of NW t, and of the past values of P, plus a constant term 
and a shock. For the Q model, the number of lags chosen is 5 months. 
 
3.4.3  Simulation exercises 
 
It must be understand that the simulation exercise presented here is an illustration and, 
given the simplified version of each model, does not have to be considered as a precise 
forecasting exercise. 
 
According to the specification of the bubbles discussed in section 1 (see chart 7), two 
periods  have been chosen for comparing the behaviour of the stock price expected by 
each model and the realised one. The first period starts from November 1927 to December 
                                                                 
51  The number of lags was chosen in order to ensure that each VECM model is not misspecified.  In this section, a 
minimum number of lags in the VECM was first chosen to avoid autocorrelation and afterwards to minimise the AIC and 
HQ information criteria.  
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1932, so that it contains the "1929 bubble". The second period starts from January 1995 to 
December 2002, so that it contains the "2000 bubble".  The simulation exercise is 
structured as follows: first, each model is estimated up to  the period  prior to the sharp 
fluctuations in the stock price and, second, based on this, dynamic forecasts are 
generated.  
 
The charts below thus display the forecasts of each model from the beginning of the 
projection. For the "1929 bubble", the end of t he sample period for the estimation is 
October 1927, while for the "2000 bubble" it is December 1994. The  black thick line 
corresponds to the simulated values and the thin grey curve corresponds to the observed 
data. Finally, the dotted lines, called the confidence intervals, capture the uncertainty of the 
forecasts
52. 
 
At this stage, it appears quite important to clarify how well to interpret the charts below. As 
previously mentioned, the forecasts are based on VECM  estimations for the P/E and Q 
models. The black thick line therefore reflects both the level of the equilibrium value of the 
stock price (taking into account the long-term relationship between the stock price and the 
fundamental) and the short-run dynamics of the model that may temporarily affect this 
long-run relationship. 
 
The central projection indicates the expected movement in the stock prices if and only if 
these prices behaved as suggested by each theory.  As a result, the values of the variation 
are in no case a guarantee of the future movement in stock prices in the reality. 
 
Furthermore, the confidence intervals represent the possible extreme values of forecasts 
given their standard deviation, also depending on the volatility of each model during the 
estimation period. 
 
Given the speculative element of the sharp movements of the stock price in both periods, it 
appears normal that the observed stock price diverges durably from the forecasted stock 
price. In this case, the observed stock price will be considered as over- or undervalued if it 
diverges from its simulated value. If the observed stock price differs from the simulated 
value but still lies within the confidence intervals, this could be explained by the short-term 
behaviour of investors which was already observed in the past. However, if the stock price 
                                                                 
52  They are based on the variance of the residuals of each model. It is also important to note that, given the high volatility of 
the observed data during the forecasting period, the black thick line, representing the forecast, may appear horizontal, 
which does not mean a constant value for the forecasts.  
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crosses the intervals of confidence,  this then means it not only  appears completely 
different from what may be justified by the fundamentals, but it also cannot be explained 
anymore given all the movements observed in the past
53. On this point, the confidence 
intervals play an interesting role since, by reflecting the uncertainty of the forecasts, they 
give an appreciation of what appears possible in the movement of stock prices given their 
whole history, i.e. during the sample period of the estimation.  It is worth noting that the 
value of the confidence intervals are strongly dependent on the time span of the 
simulation, so that their respective values in the 1929 and 2000 bubbles are not 
comparable. Indeed, to be consistent with the discussion in section 1, the simulation period 
counts 6 years for the 1929 bubble and 8 years in the 2000 bubble. 
 
  a.  The 1929 bubble 
 
As for the simulated value, both models expect a decrease of the stock price around the 
beginning of 1928, followed thereafter by a smooth recovery (charts 15 and 16). The 
average expected increase in the stock price for the period from October 1927 to June 
1932 as a whole is, in real terms, 1 p.c. a year for the Q model and 2 p.c. for the P/E 
model. For the whole period, this represents an increase of between 5 p.c. (for Q) and 10 
p.c. (for P/E).   
 
In June 1932, the upper band and the lower band of the forecasts for the stock price lie for 
example between 0.8 and -0.6 for the P/E model (for a forecast of 0.1 on average) and 
between 0.5 and -0.5 for the Q model (for a forecast of 0.5 on average). In other words, 
between October 1927 and June 1932, the confidence intervals for the P/E model point out 
that  the  maximum highest increase of the stock price could have been 60 p.c. for the 
whole period, i.e. more than 10 p.c. a year, while the maximum decrease could be 55 p.c., 
i.e. 10 p.c. on average. For the Q model, the confidence intervals suggest a maximum 
increase of 50 p.c. and a maximum decrease of 45 p.c. for the whole period
54. The wider 
confidence intervals for the P/E model confirm the results of the causality test in 
section 3.4.1, which are explained by a higher volatility of earnings. 
 
                                                                 
53  In this sense, the evolution of the observed stock price outside the confidence intervals reflects more a signal of 
expected correction than a forecast error. 
54  These confidence intervals may appear very large but the point here is not to precisely forecast the stock price. Indeed, 
the point in this section is more to analyse the behaviour of the observed data with respect to the central projection, 
which represents the equilibrium value of the stock price compatible with the fundamental, and the confidence intervals, 
which give what are the possible values for stock prices given their volatility during the estimation period.  
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Chart 15 -  P/E Model: Simulation of the real stock price from October 1927 to June 
      1932 
      (logarithms) 
 
Source: Shiller's website (see footnote 5); own calculations. 
Note: The Y-axis of the chart represents the logarithms of the S&P 500 index in level in real terms (base December 1927). 
 
Chart 16 -  Q Model: Simulation of the real stock price from October 1927 to June 
      1932 
      (logarithms) 
 
Sources: Shiller's website (see footnote 5), Smithers and Co website (see footnote 30); own calculations. 
Note: The Y-axis of the chart represents the logarithms of the S&P 500 index in level in real terms (base December 1927).  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 41 - NOVEMBER 2003  47 
 
However, as suggested by charts 15-16, the reality has been quite different. Indeed, the 
stock price was rising rapidly for exceeding the upper band of the confidence intervals. The 
Q model was also more leading than the P/E in terms of signalling. As shown by Chart 16, 
the observed stock price exceeded the confidence intervals of Q model in December 1928, 
i.e. eight months earlier than P/E model (August 1929). On the other hand, the sharp 
undervaluation was signalled by both models at around the same date in early 1932. 
 
  b.  The 2000 bubble 
 
As regards the simulated value, both models suggest an average increase around 1.5 p.c. 
a year in real terms for the S&P 500, i.e. about 10 p.c. for the whole simulation period. 
Here again, the confidence intervals are larger for the P/E model than for the Q model.  
Indeed, for the P/E model, the upper band points out a maximum increase of 14 p.c. a year 
while the lower band suggests a maximum decrease of 9 p.c. a year. For the Q model, the 
uncertainty is more limited since the upper and lower bands suggest respectively a 
maximum increase of 8 p.c. a year and a maximum decrease of 6 p.c. for the whole 
projection period.  
 
Our previous warning concerning the meaning of the central projection is particularly true 
for the 2000 bubble. Indeed, the current simulation exercise assumes that the P/E and Q 
models are the right models for explaining the behaviour of stock prices up to 1995. If that 
were the case, the investor would have been aware of the overvaluation earlier than 2000. 
Obviously, it has not been the case
55. 
 
As reported by charts 17 and 18, the significant crossing of the confidence intervals by the 
observed stock price took place in May 1997 for Q model, i.e. two months earlier than for 
P/E model ( July 1997). Furthermore, the time  span for the stock price outside the 
confidence intervals is much longer for  the  Q model than for  the  P/E model.  The 
decreasing trend in stock prices since 2000 puts them within the confidence intervals from 
February 2001 while the observed stock price came within the confidence intervals of the 
Q model a year later in March 2002.  
 
                                                                 
55   Starting the simulation exercise four years later, i.e. in 1999, the confidence intervals become wider so that the stock 
price still stand in between.  Nevertheless,  the standard misspecification tests deteriorate strongly and the estimated 
coefficients become unstable.  
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Chart 17 -  P/E Model: Simulation of the real stock price from January 1995 to  
      December 2002 
      (logarithms) 
 
Sources: BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5), S&P, Thomson Financial Datastream; own calculations. 
Note: The Y-axis of the chart represents the logarithms of the S&P 500 index in level in real terms (base December 1927). 
 
Chart 18 -  Q Model: Simulation of the real stock price from January 1995 to  
      December 2002 
      (logarithms) 
 
Sources:  BLS, Shiller's website (see footnote 5),  Smithers and Co website (see footnote  30),  Thomson Financial 
Datastream; own calculations. 
Note: The Y-axis of the chart represents the logarithms of the S&P 500 index in level in real terms (base December 1927).  
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The temporary recovery of the stock price after the terrorist attacks in 2001 still appear as 
"deeply irrational" for Q model, i.e. still outside the intervals. However, for the P/E model, 
this recovery appeared within the confidence intervals, so that it could be explained by the 
volatility of the stock price observed previously during the estimation period. Simply stated, 
this recovery could be considered as possible for the P/E model while it was not for the Q 
model
56. 
 
                                                                 
56  Note that the correction observed in stock markets is not straightforward in general. During a correction episode, the 
stock price fluctuates around a decreasing trend given short-term variations.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper gives an overview of some issues related to stock market valuation in the 
United States, focusing on the developments on the New York equity markets. 
 
The impetus for writing the paper was given by the sharp correction of the main New York 
stock price indices. Thus, S&P 500 lost 42.2 p.c. of its real value between August 2000 
and December 2002 (cut-off date). The aim of the paper is twofold: placing this movement 
in a very long term perspective and, based on history, discussing whether, despite this 
sharp correction already observed, the S&P 500 is still overvalued.   
 
This correction followed a particularly long and impressive in extent bull market.  Up until 
now, it has also been less pronounced and less long-lasting than other episodes of super 
bear markets, the most important of which had been the one that began in September 
1929 and ended in November 1958, moment when the real S&P 500 reattained its 
previous peak value. 
 
A valuation of stock markets can usually be expressed in terms of a ratio of the (stock) 
price to a fundamental. The fundamentals considered here are, according to the discount 
dividend model, annual earnings and, according to Q-theory, net worth. Our analysis has 
therefore been focused on two valuation indicators, namely Price-earnings (P/E) and Q. 
 
Deviations of the valuation indicators from their historical averages show overvaluation of 
the stock index when positive and vice versa. In the 1990s,  both valuation indicators 
moved substantially away from their long-term averages, and such upward deviations had 
never been that large in the past. This led to the bear market which started in September 
2000. In December 2002, the P/E still showed a significant overvaluation of equity prices 
when compared to their historical average but, since July 2002, the overvaluation was not 
significant in the case of Q.  The evidence is even more mixed when the comparison is 
made, for each valuation indicator, with their average over the last 10 years, raising the 
issue of their "fair value". 
 
On average, over the whole period, Q led the real stock price by one month at major turns 
and, in most cases,  both valuation indicators deviated by more than 25 p.c. from their 
historical average at the time when stock  prices reached their  major turning points.  
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However, some valuation indicators, most frequently the P/E due to the volatility of 
earnings, alerted the markets unnecessarily. 
 
Whatever the valuation indicator considered, the variables behind the extreme rises in the 
indicator were usually those which brought about their correction.  In the case of Q, this 
variable was the stock price. In the case of the P/E, earnings also played a part. The latest 
extreme downward movement in the valuation indicators is due primarily to a correction in 
real stock prices but also to a rise in the real value of the fundamental. At the end of 2002, 
the earnings were expected to keep on rising and, hence, to contribute to the still 
necessary downward adjustment of the P/E. 
 
Simulations based on VAR models for P/E and Q were carried out to check whether, on 
two occasions, the real  S&P 500 climbed to a level perceived as irrational given past 
experience and theoretical models considered, implying that a  correction h ad to be 
expected. These occasions were the so-called 1929 and 2000 bubbles.   
 
The models showed that, at some point in time before the peak in (real) stock prices was 
reached, the real S&P 500 exceeded the upper band of the 95 p.c. confidence intervals 
during both periods. For each period, Q model showed earlier and more persistent signals 
of significant overvaluation of stock prices than the P/E model. Finally, in December 2002, 
both models indicated that the stock price had come back largely within the confidence 
interval.  
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Annex 1  Testing the random walk hypothesis 
 
As discussed in section 2, a variable has to fulfil two conditions to be considered as 
following a random walk. The first and most important condition, called 
non-autocorrelation, requires that the residuals or increments of equation (1),  t e , do not 
depend on their own past values. If this is the case, we shall say the increments are not 
autocorrelated. The second condition, called homoskedasticity or non-heteroskedasticity, 
requires a constant variance for the increments,  t e . 
 
1. Test for autocorrelation 
 
The simplest way to check the first condition for the existence of a random walk process is 
to estimate equation (1) in first difference and to implement an autocorrelation test on the 
residuals or increments,  t e .  
 
In this case, the dependent variable becomes the first-difference of the stock price,  t P, 
which is regressed on a constant and its first-lag.  The  test consists of measuring the 
significance of the explanatory variable in the following estimation:  
 
  t 1 t
) 024 . 0 ( ) 001 . 0 (
t p 27 . 0 001 . 0 p e + D + = D -   (A1) 
 
If  1 t p - D  is significantly different from zero, then the null hypothesis of autocorrelation 
cannot be rejected. In this case, the estimated coefficient for  1 t p - D  is equal to 0.27 with a 
standard deviation of 0.024, what is significantly different from zero at all conventional 
significance levels
57.  
 
It is also interesting to note that the explanatory power of the estimation is the square of 
the slope coefficient of the explanatory variable. Using the results reported for equation 
(A1), we see that more than 7 p.c. of the current monthly variation of the stock price is  
                                                                 
57  Remember that the ratio between the estimated coefficient and its standard deviation, being equal here to 10.8, 
determines if the variable is significantly different from zero. By comparing this ratio to the critical value of the test, equal 
to 1.96 at 5 p.c. significance level, the explanatory variable is considered as significant if the value of the ratio is higher 
than the critical value, what is here the case.  
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explained by its variation of the previous month, what is inconsistent with the random walk 
hypothesis. 
 
2. Tests for heteroskedasticity 
 
As regards the non-heteroskedasticity condition, it requires a constant variance for the 
increments  t e , i.e. the residuals must be homoskedastic. This condition is useful as well, 
since the standard deviation, i.e. the square of the variance, determines the significance 
level of each explanatory variable. Therefore, with unstable variance, the explanatory 
variable,  1 - D t p , for  example may be significantly different from zero during some sub-
periods, but not during other sub-periods. 
 
The standard ARCH test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of non-heteroskadasticity. 
Indeed, the value of the test is F(7, 1566)=29.088 with a probability value, called p-value 
hereafter, of [0.0000].  
 
Furthermore, if the random walk hypothesis holds, the variance should be a linear function 
of the time interval
58. If that is the case, the " average variance" of  t P, denoted by 
[ ] T p Var
T
t
t /
1 ￿
=
, converges to a finite positive number decreasing linearly through time. 
Fuller (1976) also shows that, under the random walk hypothesis, the distribution of the 
first-order autocorrelation coefficient has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 
T
1 . 
                                                                 
58  According to this, the sum of the variance of the stock price over two periods, denoted spt+spt-1, must be equal to twice 
the variance of spt.  
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Annex 2  Derivation of the Discount Dividend Model 
 
Starting from the net simple return on a stock, we know that: 
  1
1 1
1 -
+
”
+ +
+
t
t t
t P
D P
h   (A2) 
where ht+1 denotes the return on stock held from period t to period t+1, Pt+1 is the price of 
stock at the end of holding and Dt+1 is the dividend per share.  If we however postulate that 
the expected stock return is a constant h, by rearranging equation (A2) we obtain: 
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  (A3) 
where  1 + t
e P  and  1 + t
e D   denotes the expectation of agents on the stock price and the 
dividends per share, based the information set at time t. After solving equation (A3) 
forward N periods, we find the classical stock return specification: 
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If we assume that Nﬁ￿, which seems reasonable over a long period of time as explained 
in Campbell et al. (1997), the second term is equal to zero and then the current stock price 
is only equal to the present discount value of expected future dividend  (per share) 
payments: 
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Starting from this, if we now postulate that dividends per share are expected to grow at a 
constant rate g, i.e. [ ] [ ] t
i
i t
e
i t
e D g D g D ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 + = + = - + +  and introduce this assumption into 
equation 5', we obtain the Gordon-Shapiro specification:  
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 is a sum of a geometric series, equation (A4'') then becomes 
simplified: 
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We easily see that this model makes the stock price extremely sensitive to a permanent 
change in the discount rate h
59. 
 
Equation (A5) induces two mechanical straightforward relationships: 
 
g h
g
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t
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  (A5') 
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where Et is the earnings (per share) after taxes and since Dt=d*(Et) with d defines as the 
pay-out ratio
60. In other words, the model predicts that stock prices will rise if investors 
expect higher future dividends (per share) and/or if they apply a lower discount rate, and 
that they will fall in the opposite case. 
 
Note furthermore that the discount factor h can be decomposed as the return on a risk-free 
asset, r t,, e.g. the long-term investment in government bonds, and a risk premium, s, 
related to the features of the asset in question
61. Equation (A5) then becomes: 
 
  ( )
g r
g D
P
t
t - +
+
=
s
1
    (A6) 
 
                                                                 
59  Note that equation (A5) holds if, and only if, R>G. For more details, see Campbell et al. (1997), Chapter 7. 
60  It is important to underline for the following that, by assuming that d is constant over time, equations (A5')- (A5'') have the 
same statistical properties. See Gordon and Shapiro (1956) and Gordon (1962). 
61  An in-depth discussion on these transformations can also be found for example in Campbell et al. (1997, Chapter 7) and 
Balke and Wohar (2001).  
5
6
 
N
B
B
 
W
O
R
K
I
N
G
 
P
A
P
E
R
 
N
o
.
 
4
1
 
-
 
N
O
V
E
M
B
E
R
 
2
0
0
3
 
  
N
B
B
 
W
O
R
K
I
N
G
 
P
A
P
E
R
 
N
o
.
 
4
1
 
-
 
N
O
V
E
M
B
E
R
 
2
0
0
3
 
5
7
 
  
58  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 41 - NOVEMBER 2003 
 
Annex 4  Might an increase in earnings continue to contribute, from now on, to
    a downward adjustment in P/E? 
 
The rise in earnings (per share), as observed between April and December 2002, might be 
expected to continue and, therefore, to contribute to the possible continuation of the 
downward correction in the P/E. This expectation is due mainly to two reasons. First, as 
reported earnings of the S&P 500 companies had fallen more than corporate profits of all 
companies recorded in the national accounts.  Second, corporate profits are highly cyclical 
and reached a low point in the last quarter of 2001. 
 
1. Earnings had fallen more than profits 
 
As reported  earnings
62 had fallen more than corporate profits (chart A1).  This 
exceptionally  more pronounced  fall in as reported earnings is mainly attributable to the 
revisions of accounts which were necessitated by the manipulations of the previous years 
(Nordhaus, 2002).  These manipulations prevented the fall in earnings just after the 
corporate profits reached their maximum in the third quarter of 1997.  Since the fourth 
quarter of 2000, this fall was however amplified because the delayed charges weighed on 
earnings at the time they were put under pressure due to the weak activity. 
 
                                                                 
62  For a description of the differences between the as reported earnings from the company accounts and profits from the 
national accounts, see Petrick (2001).  
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Chart A1 - Earnings of the S&P500 companies and corporate profits 
(billions of dollars, annualised figures) 
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Sources: BEA and S&P; own calculations. 
 
2. Profits are highly cyclical and a low had been reached 
 
A  second reason why earnings might still be expected to recover is that they are highly 
cyclical and that they reached a low point in the last quarter of 2001. 
 
On the basis of profits after tax derived from the national accounts, Chart A2 shows that:  
 
•  the profit cycles correspond, more often than not, to the business cycles approximated 
here by the development of the national income
63, of which profits are one component.  
Thus, compared with the corresponding period of the previous year, the decline in 
profits during the last few quarters under review corresponds to a phase of mediocre 
growth in national income; 
 
•  profits show more marked variations than national income.  
 
                                                                 
63   The national income is recorded here, because the profits after tax in the national accounts incorporate, as do those of 
the companies of the S&P 500, the profits which American companies derive from their activities abroad and exclude the 
profits of foreign companies made in the United States.  
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Chart A2 - Cyclical nature of American corporate profits 
(percentage changes compared to the corresponding quarter in the previous year) 
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Source: BEA; own calculations. 
 
According to chart A3, the share of corporate profits in the national income, which had 
reached a high over nearly 20 years in the third quarter of 1997 at 8.6 p.c., declined almost 
constantly from then on and amounted to barely 5.2 p.c. in the fourth quarter of 2001. This 
share has increased somewhat since then and showed a value of 5.4 p.c. in the third 
quarter of 2002. This poor performance of American companies was however not as bad 
as that observed between the third quarter of 1984 and the fourth quarter of 1987. 
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Chart A3 - Share of corporate profits in national income 
(p.c.) 
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Source: BEA; own calculations. 
 
The share of profits in the national income may also have fallen temporarily due to the 
emergence of a New Economy. Indeed, the productivity gains associated with it seem to 
have been rapped more by high skilled workers than by shareholders. 
 
7.1 
Average  
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Annex 5  The VECM Model 
 
Theoretical background 
 
The starting point of a vector error correction model (VECM ) is a vector autoregressive 
model (VAR), which is basically a multiple equation system where each variable depends 
on its own past values and the values of other variables included in the system. In our 
case here, there is an equation for the stock price, Pt, and the fundamental, Ft, and each 
equation contains the past values of the stock price, i.e. P t-1, P t-2, P t-3,...,  Pt-n, and the 
fundamental, Ft-1, Ft-2, Ft-3,..., Ft-n, as explanatory variables. Conceptually, this system can 
be written as follows: 
 
  Pt= 1 m +a11Pt-1+a12Pt-2+...+a1nPt-n..+b11Ft-1+b12Ft-2+...+b1nFt-n+e1t   
  Ft= 2 m +a21Ft-1+a22Ft-2+...+a2nFt-n..+b21Pt-1+b22Pt-2+...+b2nPt-n+e2t  (A7) 
 
where  1 m  and  2 m  denote the constant term respectively in the equation of the stock price, 
Pt, and in the equation of the fundamental, F t, while the terms e1t and e2t represent the 
increments
64. 
 
This system of two equations can be written using the vector form. Equation (A7) then 
becomes: 
 
  t t
n
1
t X X e + F + m = - ￿
=
l
l
l   (A8) 
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This VAR model can be put in an error correction form and, in this general framework, 
cointegration restrictions can be verified and imposed to the coefficients of the model
65. 
The implications of cointegration restrictions for forecasting are exposed in Clements and 
Hendry (1995).  The structure of the reaction delays of each variable is not imposed 
arbitrarily.  
                                                                 
64  For each dependent variable, P t and F t, the increments contain the part that is not explained by the past (or lagged) 
values of the dependent variable and the lagged values of the other explanatory variable. The values that are taken by 
these increments give an impulse or shock to the system, so that they are also called shocks in the VAR structure. 
65  See in particular Johansen and Juselius (1990), Johansen (1992) and Enders (1995).  
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Methodology 
 
When the variables used for the estimation display non stationary processes, it may be 
interesting to impose a restriction on the VAR structure in order to take into account this 
characteristic. Indeed, we know from section 3.4 that, on the one hand, the stock price and 
the earnings, on the other hand, the stock price and the net worth, are cointegrated while 
each variable, in level, displays a I(1) process separately. By imposing the cointegration 
restriction in the V AR structure, this amounts to estimating  a cointegrated vector 
autoregressive model. 
 
Starting from equation (A8) where X t is a 2-sized vector of I(1) variables, F l  are 2 x 2 
matrices and ut a vector of white noise error terms, we can re-parameterise it as follows:  
      t 1 t t
1 n
1
1 t 1 t t u ) X X ( A X ) 1 ( X X + - + F - m = - - - - ￿
-
=
- - l l
l
l       (A9) 
 
where  
and 
￿
+ =
F - =
n
1 j
j A
l
l  
Unit roots imply that F(1) is singular. When the VAR is cointegrated, which means that r 
cointegrating vectors exist, F(1) can be written as -ab’ where a and b are 2 x r matrices of 
rank r. b’Ct-1 is a stationary r-components vector of cointegrating relations, the fluctuations 
of which describe short-term departures from the long term relations.  a is a matrix of 
adjustment coefficients, describing the reaction of each I(1) variable to previous short term 
departures from each long term relation
66. 
 
As suggested by the cointegration tests in section 3.4, there is one rank of cointegration 
between the stock price, P, and the fundamental, F, i.e. r=1. By imposing this restriction, 
the cointegrating vector is normalised by constraining the coefficient of P to 1.
67 Clements 
and Hendry (1995) show that the estimation of the VAR with the constraint r = 1, when 
                                                                 
66  In this sense, the matrix a contains as useful information as the error correction term in the error correction mechanism  
model (ECM). See Enders (1995). 
67  For more details on the methodology, see Johansen (1992). 
￿
=
F - = F
n
1
2 I ) 1 (
l
l 
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true, strongly improves the forecasts.  Furthermore, given the results of the Wald test
68 for 
which the hypothesis b=(1,-1) is accepted for the models considered, we also estimate the 
VECM systems by imposing this restriction on the values of the coefficients in the 
cointegrating space. Finally, the estimation of the VECM  requires a large number of years 
(Campbell and Perron, 1991), what is clearly the case in the previous exercise given our 
sample. 
                                                                 
68  Over the sample period (February 1872 - July 2002), the results of this restriction test is c
2 (1)= 4.7163 [with a p-value 
= 0.03] for the P/E model and c
2 (1)= 1.0246 [with a p-value of 0.314] for the Q model.  
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